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This article discusses some economic issues linked to the 2006 European regulation 
regarding geographical indications. Economic implications of this regulation for 
foreign producers are investigated. The article examines whether or not the 
development of a geographical indication is a profitable strategy for foreign producers. 
The discussion here concludes that geographical indications may allow such producers 
access to a high-quality segment of the market, but efficient quality management is a 
necessary condition for reaching such a segment. 
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Introduction 
eographical indications (GIs) are designations voluntarily adopted by 
agricultural producers; the state provides property-rights protection for GIs, laws 
against false descriptions of characteristics, and sometimes quality-monitoring 
assistance. GIs are used as signals to consumers of quality or other attributes based on 
the geographic origins of food products. GIs are available to any producer within the 
specified region of origin. GIs raise issues of access to domestic markets for foreign 
producers who want to compete in the GI niche.  
Disagreements over the European Union’s system for regulating GIs led the 
United States to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization against the 
European Union regulation in 1999. In 2005, the WTO released the panel report 
regarding the European GI system. The panel’s conclusions and recommendations led 
the European Union to revise its rules governing how international GIs are treated 
(WTO, 2005). The regulation now allows recognition of foreign GIs by the EU GI 
system and access to the EU market with the European GI logo for foreign producers. 
This article focuses mainly on economic impacts, as other articles in this special 
issue will detail the legal aspects of GIs. In particular, this article abstracts from many 
issues being addressed within the Doha Round, such as issues regarding the creation 
of a multilateral register of wines and spirits (see Kerr, 2006, and Vincent, 2007). 
Moreover, this article is not an exhaustive presentation of all economic impacts (see 
complete reviews by Fink and Maskus, 2005, and Josling, 2006). 
The discussion here details how recent WTO and EU decisions may affect the use 
of GIs by foreign producers. The first part presents the recent decisions announced in 
2005 and 2006 and discusses whether or not these decisions pave the way for access 
to the high-quality segment for products originating in developing countries. The 
second part seeks to answer the following question: Is the development of a GI a 
profitable strategy for foreign producers? The discussion is based on microeconomic 
argumentation.  
The WTO Decision and the European Regulation 
he European Union provides specific legislation for the registration, certification, 
and protection of GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs via the EC 
Regulation No. 2081/92. GIs are classified as either Protected Designations of Origin 
(PDOs) or Protected Geographical Indications (PGIs) at the European level (European 
Commission, 1992).  
PDO is “the term used to describe foodstuffs which are produced, processed and 
prepared in a given geographical area using recognized know-how” (European 
G 
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Commission, 2006). The designation PGI means “the geographical link must occur in 
at least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation. Furthermore, the 
product can benefit from a good reputation” (European Commission, 2006). The 
European regulation sets up a link between the origin of the product and one or 
several characteristics that can be identified by consumers. These characteristics 
include high-quality dimensions, since reputation matters in the PGI definition. 
Controversies between the European Union and the United States over protection 
of GIs led the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel to determine 
whether EC Regulation No. 2081/92, regulating GIs, violated the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO (Babcock 
and Clemens, 2004). The U.S. challenge of the EU regulation was based on the 
following points: (1) discrimination against foreign products with respect to 
geographical indication protection and (2) failure to protect foreign trademarks. These 
failures violated the WTO principle of national treatment, which requires members to 
provide at least equal treatment to domestic and foreign producers regarding 
intellectual property rights. In 1999, the United States contended that Regulation 
2081/92 did not “provide sufficient protection to pre-existing trademarks that are 
similar or identical to a geographical indication” and was inconsistent with the 
European Union’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 2006). In 2003, the 
United States filed an additional request for consultations concerning the protection of 
trademarks and GIs for agricultural products and foodstuffs, contending that 
Regulation 2081/92 impeded foreign producers from accessing the European GIs. The 
U.S. position with respect to its domestic market is that its trademark laws (in the 
form of certification marks) adequately protect U.S. and non-U.S. GIs alike, and that 
there is no further need for special property-rights protection for GIs. A WTO dispute 
settlement panel was formed in October 2003. 
In April 2005, the WTO panel ruled that EC Regulation 2081/92 was inconsistent 
with the TRIPS Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
GATT) in several respects (WTO, 2005). In particular, the panel determined that EU 
regulations were inconsistent “with respect to the equivalence and reciprocity 
conditions, as applicable to the availability of protection for GIs” and that the 
European Union could not deny GI protection to third-country products from 
countries whose GI protection systems were not equivalent to the EU system (WTO, 
2005). In other words, foreign producers should be guaranteed the same access that 
EU producers have to the EU system for protecting GIs. 
Guaranteed access is a contentious question, because producers from non-EU 
countries with different approaches regarding the link between GI and quality wish to   S. Marette 
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register GIs under the EU system to receive the benefits of the PDO/PGI seals that are 
known by some EU consumers (Loisel and Couvreur, 2001). 
The panel also determined that the EU regulation failed to protect pre-existing 
trademarks from confusing uses of GIs and that the European Union could not require 
third-country government participation in the processes of verification and 
transmission of applications, verification and transmission of objections, and 
inspection structures and declarations (WTO, 2005). Given that these inconsistencies 
“nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the United States”, the panel recommended 
that Regulation No. 2081/92 be brought into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement 
and the GATT.  
In response to the WTO panel decision, the European Union published Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 510/2006 on March 20, 2006 (European Commission, 2006). 
The new regulation, which came into force on March 31, 2006, more clearly defines 
EU systems for recognition and registration of third-country GIs, allows individuals 
and groups to apply for registration of a third-country GI in the European Union 
without participation of the third-country government, and provides greater protection 
for pre-existing trademarks. Article 2.1 of Regulation 510/2006 requires that the 
agricultural product or foodstuff for which application for a GI is being made 
“possesses a specific quality, reputation, or other characteristics attributable to that 
geographical origin” (European Commission, 2006).  
The new regulation satisfies most U.S. concerns about registration of third-
country food products and moves toward mutual recognition. With enactment of EC 
Regulation 510/2006, a foreign producer now has a chance of registering a PDO or 
PGI in the European Union. Once an application has been filed, the commission has 
up to 12 months to scrutinize it. If the commission determines that the conditions of 
the regulation have been met, the application is published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, and interested parties have 6 months in which to file an objection 
(see additional details about the regulation in Marette et al., 2008).  
The full story of the impact of this regulation on registrations has yet to emerge. 
To protect the common reputation of the PDO/PGI system, the commission may be 
tempted to reject applications from some foreign producers who apply for European 
GIs despite the absence of a precise link between quality and origin. On the other 
hand, the fact that the PDO/PGI system has registered more than 700 GIs (excluding 
wines and spirits) in the European Union suggests that this system is prone to accept 
foreign GIs. Even though Colombian coffee was recently accepted as a European PGI, 
it is hard to predict from this instance the chances that other groups of producers from 
third countries will be accepted, since producers of Colombian coffee were already   S. Marette 
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organized for promoting quality and the product was recognized in Europe by many 
consumers before the PGI application. Further, it is not clear how many GI 
applications foreign producers will make under this regulation. 
Even though the United States was the primary complainant for the WTO panel 
report of March 2005, it seems likely that the opportunity to apply for a PGI/PDO 
under the EU system will be used mainly by non-U.S. farmers, as U.S. certification 
marks as GIs are not used a lot in the United States (see table 1 in Marette et al., 
2008). The new European regulation is mainly an opportunity for producers from 
developing countries that have experienced difficulties entering western markets and 
protecting property rights. European consumers may be interested in new GIs that 
signal food products with specific tastes. This is the case for cocoa or coffee, for 
which consumers’ willingness to pay may be high and for which origin matters 
because of tastes specific to countries from South America or Africa (for instance, the 
Ethiopian coffees named Sidamo, Harar, and Yirgacheffe). 
Regulation 510/2006 conforms to the WTO panel decision that producers from 
third countries be allowed to register a PDO/PGI. Regulation by the European 
Commission should allow uniform implementation of the regulation, thereby allowing 
the same protection and potential benefits to third-party PDOs/PGIs as those allowed 
to GI products from member states.  
Economic Discussion 
he new regulation allows the EU regulatory system to recognize and protect 
foreign GIs and allows foreign producers to apply directly for registration of GI 
products in the European Union. The regulation holds the promise of national 
treatment for non-EU producers. These changes represent clear progress in terms of 
market integration but raise a number of issues that are addressed briefly in this 
section which focuses on economic arguments (see also Bramley and Kirsten, 2007). 
The key issue is whether or not foreign producers, in particular producers from 
developing countries, will apply for PDOs/PGIs in order to promote the quality of 
their products.  
In a situation of quality uncertainty, GIs provide value when they protect the 
common reputation of farmers who strive to promote the quality of their products or a 
given characteristic, including specific processes of production (Bureau et al., 1998). 
GIs aim at increasing profits by attracting interested consumers who are willing to pay 
a premium for products of a specific area. The acceptance conferred by a European GI 
may help foreign farmers to benefit, through use of the European PDO/PGI logos, 
from access to a high-quality segment of the market. Do the development of a GI and 
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the process of application to the EU system bring enough benefit to farmers to make 
these activities worth their while?  
The export strategies of third-country producers may lead to new applications to 
the EU system of GIs governed by regulation 510/2006. Producers from third 
countries will hope to benefit from the higher willingness to pay that is a characteristic 
of some EU consumers. Empirical evidence supports the notions that some consumers 
are interested in obtaining more information about the conditions of production from 
different countries and that increased international trade leads to a higher consumer 
sensitivity regarding the origins of products. The empirical literature suggests that a 
significant effect on prices or consumers’ willingness to pay exists, even if the price 
premium may be relatively low and clearly depends on each specific GI (see 
McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003, for a review).  
As McCluskey and Loureiro mention, “The major generalization we can draw 
from [the] group of empirical studies on consumer response to food labeling is that the 
consumer must perceive high eating quality in order for the food product to command 
a premium. This was particularly important for socially responsible and origin-based 
products” (2003, p. 101). This finding means that good quality is essential to 
obtaining a premium with a GI.  
Quality management mainly relies on sunk-cost spending, for example, 
certification and/or high-skill workers. Application and verification costs may limit 
access to the GI system of the EU for some groups of small farmers because of these 
large sunk costs. If quality and information are produced at a sunk cost, a firm—by 
selecting a relatively high level of quality—can potentially drive competitors with 
lower-quality products out of a market (Shaked and Sutton, 1987). As sunk costs are 
not passed on to consumers via prices, elimination of potential rivals is possible. As a 
result, concentration at the producer level increases. Marette and Crespi (2003), 
Marette et al. (1999), and Lence et al. (2007) showed that sunk costs linked to quality 
management for farmers’ organizations explain the concentration and the necessity of 
supply control among farmers inside a GI. 
The data presented below suggest that market concentration exists for the 
“successful” GIs, that is, the GIs with a significant market share. Table 1 shows that 
the first ten Italian PDOs and PGIs accounted in 2004 for 82 percent of total (domestic 
and foreign) sales (value calculated at retail level) of Italian PDOs and PGIs. (At the 
end of 2004 there were over 140 Italian PDOs and PGIs.) Note that the first three 
PDOs/PGIs alone account for 56 percent of total sales. 
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Table 1  Sales and Market Shares of the Top Ten Italian PDOs/PGIs   
  2004 sales 
(million euros) 
2004 market share 
(percentage)
Prosciutto di Parma  1776  23
Parmigiano Reggiano  1499  19
Grana Padano  1154  14
Prosciutto di San Daniele  481  6
Gorgonzola 378  4
Pecorino Romano  328  4
Bresaola della Valtellina  315  4
Mozzarella di Bufala Campana  278  3
Speck dell'Alto Adige  219  2
Mortadella di Bologna  204  2
Total   82
Source: ISMEA (2006).  
 
This table raises the point that consumers recognize Prosciutto di Parma, 
Parmigiano Reggiano and Grana Padano as specific brands with established 
reputations rather than as products signaled via the GI system. These products benefit 
from a significant price premium compared to the basic products. The quality 
reputation of these three products is the essential condition for having large market 
shares. 
The link between quality management and the recognized GIs is not specific to 
Italy. The practice of “coupling” PGI/PDO to quality systems is also frequently used 
in France, where the Label Rouge is mainly given to products with GIs. The Label 
Rouge (LR) system benefits from a quality reputation mainly in the case of poultry. In 
2004, the average price for a Label Rouge chicken was €6.06/kg versus €2.48/kg for 
the cheapest chicken on the shelf (Label Rouge, 2007). The reputation of Label Rouge 
dominates the reputations of other systems for signaling quality.  
Table 1 shows that market shares matter. Food items marked with prominent 
locations are comparable to branded products, whereas a rather unknown EU label 
may not influence consumers’ choices at all. In the case of a well-known GI, 
producers may benefit from the European regulation because of the protection against 
misuse by competitors, the quality assurance scheme, and the possibility of supply 
control (see Lence et al., 2008). 
Table 1 suggests that the concentration effect mentioned above seems to operate 
inside the GI system. A few GIs dominate the market and are able to partially extract 
consumers’ willingness to pay for products from a specific origin, while other GIs 
have tiny market shares with no influence on consumers’ choices. Clearly from table 
1, the 130 remaining Italian PDOs/PGIs, with 18 percent of total sales shared among   S. Marette 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    72
them, are “scattered” in terms of economic impact and reputation. For some of them, 
the link between the geographic origin and the specific quality may be elusive. It is 
difficult for small GIs or new entrants from third countries that benefit from the new 
EU regulation to establish their reputations. 
The foregoing point is linked to the sensitive issue of the plethora of GIs in 
Europe; accompanying this plethora is the risk that consumers will be confused and 
find it difficult to identify high-quality products. Except for the “famous” GIs, such as 
the ones appearing in table 1, label proliferation is the main flaw of the GI system. 
Marette et al. (2008) count approximately 700 geographical indications (excluding 
wines and spirits) currently registered in the European Union. Peri and Gaeta (1999) 
count more than 400 official appellations in the wine sector in Italy, 450 appellations 
in France, and 1,397 in the wine sector in Europe overall. 
This label proliferation creates confusion for consumers. Indeed, Loisel and 
Couvreur (2001) show that even in France such signals of quality are not clear to 
many consumers. For example, the recognition of quality labels by French consumers 
is only 43 percent for Label Rouge (a high-quality seal for poultry), 18 percent for 
l’Agriculture Biologique (organic food), and only 12 percent for Appellations 
d’Origine Contrôlée (the French GI). One major problem is simply the legibility and 
clarity of a label, especially one showing some official seal. Although Label Rouge is 
a well-established label, which suggests that reputation matters, the fact that less than 
half of French consumers recognize it is suggestive of the problems inherent in any 
label and GIs in particular. 
The previous examples suggest that the effectiveness of GIs as signals of quality 
may be lowered because of GI proliferation. Under these circumstances, producers 
who cannot or choose not to enter a protected GI system can always turn to the 
classical trademark system, which protects foreign brands in the European Union and 
many other countries. In such a context of GI proliferation, quality management is 
crucial to establishing a reputation and getting high prices. Given the proliferation of 
GIs, there is a risk that some may give rise to unsubstantiated claims that do not help 
consumers clarify their opinions on characteristics of food products. These “poor” GIs 
may tarnish the credibility of “serious” GIs that employ rigorous certification 
processes in order to maintain quality. 
The European Union considers the GI system to be an effective method of 
protecting quality in agricultural products and has enacted policies to support the use 
of GIs. As shown in the previous section, the new regulation 510/2006 allows the EU 
regulatory system to recognize and protect foreign GIs and allows foreign producers 
to apply directly for registration of GI products in the European Union. Geographical   S. Marette 
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indications may help producers enter the PDO/PGI segment of the market, but only a 
few products are likely to benefit from large market shares because of an established 
reputation (see table 1). An alternative option could be to develop private brands, 
where efficient quality management is a necessary condition for reaching high-quality 
segments in order to obtain decent incomes. 
Farmers from developing countries may be interested in using PGIs/PDOs to enter 
the EU high-quality market. One interesting option for farmers in developing 
countries would be to “couple” the PGIs/PDOs with private brands or other labels 
such as fair trade labels, which are supposed to favour decent incomes for “poor” 
farmers. Recently, labels associated with fair trade and fair working conditions in 
developing countries have gained prominence, although producers’ market share in 
Western countries is relatively limited (between 2 percent and 4 percent for different 
products and locations; see Krier,  2006). By “coupling” PGIs/PDOs with private 
brands or other labels, farmers may collectively capture a share of the willingness to 
pay exhibited by European consumers interested in the origins of products, allowing 
producers to set the high prices necessary to cover certification costs. The PGI/PDO 
provides protection against misuse and a quality assurance scheme, both of which are 
precious for small farmers using fair trade labels.  
Based on the previous discussion, it is a thorny question whether or not the new 
European regulation is appropriate to help small farmer’s cooperatives to set up 
quality assurance schemes as a basis for exporting high-quality products into the EU. 
On the positive side, a GI increases profits by attracting interested consumers who are 
willing to pay a premium for products from a specific area. The European GI system 
may help farmers determine an efficient system for managing quality. On the negative 
side, GI proliferation hobbles the chances of having a well-known GI that will 
influence consumers’ decisions. In such a context, covering the sunk costs of 
certification and advertising may be impossible for small cooperatives because of a 
likely lack of consumers’ recognition, which in turn leads to the absence of price 
premium. It is likely that the negative aspects outweigh the positive aspects. However, 
additional empirical/econometric studies are necessary, measuring both positive and 
negative aspects linked to GI adoption. 
Conclusion 
he WTO panel decision and the new EU regulation represent significant progress 
in the WTO negotiations, because they move GI protection toward mutual  T   S. Marette 
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recognition of GI registration systems among countries. The WTO panel decision 
demonstrates that the WTO process is compatible with EU efforts to differentiate and 
label quality in agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that labels on goods often convey information 
that affects consumers’ purchasing decisions. GIs may help allow foreign producers 
access to a high-quality segment of the European market, but efficient quality 
management is a necessary condition for reaching such a segment and increasing 
profits.   S. Marette 
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